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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
North Carolina amendment statutes are closely in accord with the Fed-
eral Rules55 except in connection with the all important matter of rela-
tion back. The relation back provision of the Federal Rules is as
follows:
"15(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or de-
fense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, trans-
action, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading." 56
This rule does not defeat the legitimate use of the statute of limitations.
It does, however, prevent the defendant from defeating the plaintiff's
claim on a technicality in the pleading. This is the desired result and
avowed purpose of modem pleading. The adoption of the above pro-
vision from the Federal Rules by the North Carolina legislature would
clarify the present confusion on this issue and place the North Carolina
rules of pleading in accord with the liberal and just practice of modem
pleading.
WiLL AM A. DRas, JR.
Survival of Personal Injury Actions in North Carolina
In a recent case,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
where a person is injured by the actionable negligence of another, and
later dies as the result of such injuries, a cause of action for consequen-
tial damages sustained by the injured person between the date of the
injury and the date of the death survives to the personal representative
of such deceased person. Prior to 1915, it was the unquestioned 2 law
of this jurisdiction that such causes of action did not survive. Causes
of action for personal injury not causing death were expressly denied
survival by the statute.8 It was held that the legislature, in denying
survival to causes of action where the injury did not cause the death
ment at any later stage of the action, if the adverse party was fairly apprised of
its nature by the original pleading, and that the plaintiff was claiming thereunder,
provided no new party is added thereby."
11Compare N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-161 with Fed. Rule 15(a); compare N. C.
GEN. STAT. §1-163 with Fed. Rule 15(b); compare N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-167 with
Fed. Rule 15(d) ; see Nassaney v. Culler, 224 N. C. 323, 30 S. E. (2d) 226 (1944);
cited supra note 10.
" Applied with approval in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 323 U. S. 574,
65 S. Ct. 421, 89 L. ed. 465 (1944). See also MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §15.08;
Notes (1944) 23 N. C. L. Ray. 141, 145; (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 311.
'Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. et a[., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. (2d) 105(1946).
2But cf. Peebles v. N. C. R. R., 63 N. C. 238 (1869). Prior to enactment of
survival statute, causes of action for personal injury were held to survive under




and in creating a new cause of action by the wrongful death statute
where the injury did cause the death, intended to deny survival to all
causes of action for personal injury.4 An amendment in 19155 struck
from the list of actions denied survival the following: ". . . or other
injuries to the person where such injury does not cause the death of
the injured party." Prior to the principal case, it was held6 that under
the amendment causes of action for personal injury arising from a negli-
gent act, the injury not causing death, survived; and by obiter dicta that
all such causes of action for personal injury, regardless of the cause of
Aeath, would survive. In the principal case, the court following this
dicta and supported by a federal case7 in accord held that where a per-
son dies as the result of injuries sustained by the actionable negligence
of another, the right of action for personal injury existing in the de-
ceased at the time of death survives to the personal representative of
the deceased persons; the damages recoverable-i.e., such damages as were
sustained by the deceased during his lifetime-are an asset of the estate
to be administered as other property possessed by the deceased at his
death; and the survival of such right of action does not affect the
accrual of the cause of action under the wrongful death statute.
By a combination of the holdings of the two cases 8 construing the
survival statute as amended, and from the terms of the survival statute,e
it is clear that where a right of action exists as the result of injuries
sustained by negligence and either the injured person or the negligent
tortfeasor dies, the right of action for personal injury survives to or
against the personal representative of the deceased person. The death
of the tortfeasor, either before or after the accrual of a cause of action
for wrongful death, would not affect the death action due to the pro-
vision of the wrongful death statute that such actions can be maintained
against the personal representative of a deceased tortfeasor.10
The result of these two holdings, then, is to place rights of action
for personal injury within the terms of the general section1 ' rather than
the excepting section 12 of the survival statute. It follows, therefore,
that all rights of action for personal injury survive to and against the
personal representative unless otherwise denied survival by the statute.
'Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635, L. R. A.
1916 D. 635 (1915); Watts v. Vanderbilt, 167 N. C. 567, 83 S. E. 813 (1914);
Bolick v. Southern Ry., 138 N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689 (1905).
N. C. Pub. Laws 1915, c. 38.
'Fuquay v. A. & W. R. R., 199 N. C. 499, 155 S. E. 167 (1930).TJames Baird & Co. v. Boyd, 41 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. (2d) 105 (1946);
Fuquay v. A. & W. R. Co., 199 N. C. 499, 155 S. E. 167 (1930).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§28-172 and 28-175.
"0 Tonkins v. Cooper, 187 N. C. 570, 122 S. E. 294 (1924).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §28-172.11 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §28-175.
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Since the excepting section denies survival to rights of action for assault
and battery,13 it would seem that rights of action for personal injury
arising out of an assault and battery would not survive. Whether this
will be held to extend to all wilful injury cases, and thereby limit the
present holdings to negligence cases, remains open for decision. If the
present holdings are so limited, there will probably be further legislation,
since it would seem unjust to allow survival against a negligent tort-
feasor and deny survival against a wilful tortfeasor.
The court went to pains to make it clear that the right of the injured
person to sue for personal injury of any kind was separate and distinct
from the right of the personal representative to sue under the right of
action conferred by the wrongful death statute. The former right is
personal to the deceased during his lifetime, and upon death survives
as an asset of his estate to his personal representative; while on the other
hand, the latter right accrues to the personal representative at the date
of death, not as an asset of the estate, but for the benefit of a particular
class of beneficiaries. It was further pointed out that although both
rights of action have as a basis the same wrongful act, there is no over-
lapping of damages recoverable since the measure of damages in each
case is determinable upon separate elements of damage. It will be noted
that the court refers to and distinguishes two rights of action. Does
this mean, as to the personal representative, that there is one cause of
action or two?
It is clear that the personal representative is the only person who
can sue on either claim,' 4 and there is but one wrongful act giving rise
to both claims. Furthermore, it is clear that ordinarily when two per-
sonal rights of the same person are infringed upon by the same wrong-
ful act but one cause of action exists.' 5 However, there are here
numerous grounds for distinction. The rights involved in the issue
at hand have separate and distinct sources, 16 each accrues as against
the tortfeasor at different times,' 7 each is subject to a different limita-
tion, 18 each recovery involves different elements of damage,' 9 each
" N. C. GE'. STAT. (1943) §28-175(2).
"
4 Personal injury: N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §28-172; Suskin v. Maryland
Trust Co., 214 N. C. 347, 199 S. E. 276 (1938). Wrongful death: Hanes v. South-
ern Pub. Util. Co., 191 N. C. 13, 131 S. E. 402 (1925); Hood v. Amer. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 162 N. C. 70, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913).
" Eller v. Carolina & N. W. R., 140 N. C. 140, 52 S. E. 305, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.)
225 (1905) ; cf. Underwood v. Dooly, 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 686, 64 A. L. R.
656 (1929) (one cause of action exists, but insurer may sue on subrogation).
' h right against personal injury is a natural common law right, while the
right against death is purely statutory.
The personal injury action accrues at the date of the injury, while the death
action accrues at the date of death. Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C.
332, 337, 38 S. E. (2d) 105, 109 (1946).
"'The injury action is subject to a three year limitation. N. C. GEtr. STAT.(1943) §1-52(5) ; while the death action must be commenced within one year of
the death as a condition precedent to the action, Curlee v. Duke Power Co., 205
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recovery is for a different purpose,2° and the decedent never possessed
the right to sue for wrongful death. 2' Furthermore, it is held that
rights given by a statute, as compared with natural rights or rights given
by other statutes, give rise to an independent cause of action.
2 2 It
would seem, therefore, that two causes of action exist.m
Assuming then, that two causes of action exist, may they be properly
joined in one action? In the principal case the two actions had been
joined, but this joinder was not questioned on appeal, and the court
made no comment thereon. Under the joinder statute,24 a joinder of
causes of action arising out of the same transaction is permissive. It is
evident that the causes of action in question arise out of the same trans-
action-i.e., the wrongful act of the tortfeasor-and could, therefore, be
joined. Question, however, might arise as to the joinder of the parties,
since the personal representative is suing in two different fiduciary
capacities 25 However, he is the only person permitted to maintain
either action. 28 It would seem that in view of the announced purpose
of allowing a joinder of all actions xisting between the parties when-
ever possible,27 the dual capacity of the personal representative would
not prevent a joinder of the actions, 28 since the dual capacity in itself
could not prejudice the defendant. There would also seem to be a
question as to the present standing of the line of cases holding that
the personal representative cannot, by amending a personal injury action
N. C. 644, 172 S. E. 329 (1933); Trull v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 151 N. C. 545,
66 S. E. 586 (1909).
" The damages recoverable in the injury action are those suffered by the in-jured party during his lifetime, Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C.
332, 337, 38 S. E. (2d) 105, 109 (1946); while the damages recoverable in the
death action are the compensation for the injury resulting from the death. N. C.
GFN. STAT. (1943) §28-174.
2' The damages recovered in the injury action are an asset of the estate, Hoke
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 337, 38 S. E. (2d) 105, 109 (1946) ;
while the damages recovered in the death action are for a particular class of
beneficiaries. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §28-173.
21 Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. (2d) 105 (1946).
"'Fuquay v. A. & W. Ry., 199 N. C. 499, 155 S. E. 167 (1930); Capps v.
A. C. L. R. R., 183 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533 (1922).
2 "Murphy v. St. L. I. M. & S. R. R., 92 Ark. 159, 122 S. W. 636 (1909) ; Stew-
art v. Electric Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 Atl. 49, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 384,
118 Am. St. Rep. 410 (1906); Bowen v. City of Boston, 155 Mass. 344, 29 N. E.
633, 15 L. I. A. 365 (1892) ; Gorman v. Columbus & So. Ohio Electric Co., 144
Ohio St. 593, 60 N. E. (2d) 700 (1944) ; May Coal Co. v. Robinette, 120 Ohio St.
110, 165 N. E. 576, 64 A. L. R. 441 (1929) ; Brown v. Chicago & N. W. R. R.,
102 Wis. 137, 77 N. W. 748, 44 L. R. A. 579 (1898).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-123.
,' In the personal injury action he is suing for the benefit of the estate, while
in the death action he is suing for the benefit of a special class of beneficiaries.
See note 20 supra.
"See note 14 supra.
'*Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N. C. 1 (1885); Hamlin v. Tucker, 72 N. C. 502
(18"Moyer v. City of Oshkosh, 151 Wis. 586, 139 N. W. 378 (1913) ; Nemecek
v. Filler & Stowell Co., 126 Wis. 71, 105 N. W. 225 (1905).
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commenced by the deceased, allege a cause of action for wrongful
death." When this rule was laid down, the action commenced by the
deceased abated at death, and the amendment was not a mere joining
of two causes of action but a substitution of one action for the other.
Today, since the personal representative may continue the suit com-
menced by his deceased, and the amendment would be a mere joining
thereto of the death action, it would seem that such joinder should be
allowed3 0 However, the date of the amendment would have to be
within one year of the death, as the death action could not date from the
comemncement of the prior action.31
If, then, there be two causes of action which may be joined, would
a recovery, release, or bar in one action by the personal representative
bar a recovery on the other action under the doctrine of res judicata?
It is well established in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that a recovery
or release by the injured person will bar the accrual of the death action. 2
This holding would not necessarily apply when the personal represent-
ative has recovered on one cause or has given a release, since the basis
of the former holding was laid on the terms of the wrongful death
statute and not on res judicata.3 A judgment is decisive between the
parties as to all points raised by the pleadings, or which might properly
be predicated upon them,34 but this does not embrace any matter which
might have been brought into the litigation, or any causes of action
which might have been joined, but which in fact were neither joined nor
embraced in the pleadings.85 In order to support a plea of res judicata,
there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and issues.30 The
court in the principal case clearly pointed out that the issue of damage
"p Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635, L. R. A.
1916D 121 (1915) ; Bolick v. Southern Ry., 138 N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689 (1905).
"' The cases cited supra note 29 have language to the effect that a joinder
would not be possible since the death action has not accrued at the commencement
of the prior action; however, the court has held that this fact would not in itself
preclude such an amendment, provided the pleadings as amended do not allege a
wholly distinct claim which does not stem out of the original transaction. Nassaney
v. Culler, 224 N. C. 323, 30 S. E. (2d) 226 (1944).
1 1 Ibid.
", Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635, L. R. A.
1916D 121 (1915); see TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Acr (2nd ed.) §124, and
cases there cited. But see Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Sur-
v2val Statutes (1924) 23 MIcH. L. Rav. 114, 119.
"' Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635, L. R. A.
1916D 121 (1915) (the terms of the wrongful death statute ". .. such as would, if
the injured party had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor"
require the existence of a right of action in the deceased at the date of death as
a condition precedent to the accrual of the action).
" Jefferson v. Southern Land Sales Corp., 220 N. C. 76, 16 S. E. (2d) 462(1941); Burton v. Carolina Light & Power Co., 217 N. C. 1, 6 S. E. (2d) 822
(1939).
",Stancil v. Wilder, 222 N. C. 706, 24 S. E. (2d) 527 (1942) ; Whitaker v. Gar-
ren, 167 N. C. 658, 83 S. E. 759 (1914) ; Ledwick v. Penny, 158 N. C. 104, 73 S. E.
228 (1911).8 Leary v. Va.-Car. Land Bank, 215 N. C. 501, 2 S. E. (2d) 570 (1939).
[Vol. 25
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in each case is determinable upon separate and distinct elements of dam-
age, and there could be no overlapping of damages recoverable. There-
fore, it would seem that unless the pleadings in the action brought by
the personal representative embraced all the points necessary for de-
termining the elements of damage in both actions, and all the elements
were submitted on the issue of damages, there would be no identity of
issues.8 7 However, it is clear that the issues determined in the action
would be not open to question in the second action.38 It follows, there-
fore, that an adverse verdict on the issue of negligence would bar the
second action. The effect of a release by the personal representative
would depend upon the terms of the release, and whatever rights were
released in the contemplation of the parties would be barred.39 Fur-
thermore, as to the personal representative, it would seem that neither
the bar of the statute of limitations on the personal injury action nor
the failure to bring the wrongful death action within one year of the
death would bar a recovery on the other action, since each action is
separate and distinct, and subject to a different limitation.49 It follows
therefore, that a recovery, release or bar as to either of the causes of
action by the personal representative will not bar a recovery on the
other cause of action under the doctrine of res judicata .41
Inquiring further into the nature of the surviving action, is a cause
of action for personal injury, standing alone, an asset in this jurisdiction
such as would support the establishment of an ancillary administration
of a deceased nonresident injured within this jurisdiction? It has been
repeatedly held that the cause of action for wrongful death is an asset
which will support the establishment of an ancillary administration.42
The basis of this holding is laid on the premise that, although the re-
covery in the wrongful death action is not an asset of the estate, to hold
otherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute. The same result
would more logically follow as to the cause of action surviving under
the survival statute since the recovery thereon is an asset of the estate.
Furthermore, a cause of action for personal injury is a chose in action ; 4
Connor v. Connor, 223 N. C. 664, 28 S. E. (2d) 240 (1943).
"Leary v. Va.-Car. Land Bank, 215 N. C. 501, 2 S. E. (2d) 570 (1939).
*0 Electric Supply Co. v. Burgess, 223 N. C. 97, 25 S. E. (2d) 390 (1943);
Merrimon v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 207 N. C. 101, 176 S. E. 246 (1934).
,' See note 18 supra.
'Murphy v. St. L. I. M. & S. R. R., 92 Ark. 159, 122 S. W. 636 (1909) ; Stew-
art v. United Electric Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 Atl. 49, 8 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 384, 118 Am. St. Rep. 410 (1906) ; Mahoning Valley Ry. v. Van Alstine, 77
Ohio St. 395, 83 N. E. 601, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 893 (1908) ; see Brown v. Chicago
& N. W. R. R., 102 Wis. 137, 77 N. W. 748, 44 L. R. A. 579 (1898).
"' Farn v. N. C. R. R., 155 N. C. 136, 71 S. E. 81 (1911) ; Vance v. R. R.,
138 N. C. 460, 50 S. E. 860 (1905).
"' Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill, - Tex. Civ. App. - , 297 S. W.
778 (1927); Sharp v. Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 133 Tenn. 1, 179 S. W. 375(1915).
19461
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a chose in action44 or a right of action is property ;45 and property is an
asset.46 Thus whether the court follow its result as to the wrongful
death action or apply the foregoing logic, it would seem that a cause
of action for personal injury, standing alone, is an asset which will
support the establishment of an ancillary administration.
If the court should not reach this result, it would seem that a right
of action surviving under the statute to a nonresident would be of no
value if service or recovery could not be had elsewhere. It is clear that
where a right of action for personal injury accrues in a state other than
the domicil of the deceased, the law of the scene of the injury decides
whether there is a survival of the right of action.47 Since a personal
injury action is transitory,48 if the action survive, it may be prosecuted
in a state other than the scene of the injury, and that state will enforce
the right provided jurisdiction may be had of all the necessary parties,
and the enforcement of such right is not contrary to the public policy
of the forum 49 or the laws of the forum are not so different from the
laws of the scene of the injury as to work an injustice on the defend-
ant.50 It is evident, therefore, that where a nonresident is injured in
this jurisdiction and later dies, and either service cannot be obtained on
the tortfeasor in the domiciliary state, or the laws of that state are such
that there can be no recovery on the surviving right of action, the per-
sonal representative must proceed either in this state, where the right
accrued, or in some state where service and recovery may be had. Since
a foreign administrator or executor cannot sue in this jurisdiction,5 1 it
would be necessary for ancillary administration to be established here.
Finally, what is the measure of consequential damages recoverable?
The court in broad terms lays down the general measure: those damages
resulting to the deceased during his lifetime.52 The court made it clear,
however, that the various elements of the consequential damages con-
stitute but one cause of action.53 The elements of damage would seem
"'Ibid.; In re Morace, 111 Md. 372, 74 At. 375 (1909).
"' Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931); Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 189 (1918).
46 See "Assets," BLACK'S LAW DICT ONARY (3rd ed. 1933), p. 153. In general
see 4 WoRDs AND PHRASES, p. 464; 21 Am. JuR., p. 475.
"I Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931); Potter v.
First Nat. Bank of Morristown, 107 N. J. Eq. 72, 151 Atl. 546 (1930) ; see BME,
THE CoNFLIcr OF LAWS (1935) §309.1.
4MacGovern & Co. v. A. C. L. R. R., 180 N. C. 219, 104 S. E. 534 (1920).
Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931). But see
Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182 N. Y. S. 803 (1920).
"' Higgins v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., 155 Mass. 176, 29 N. E. 534, 31 Am. St.
Rep. 544 (1892); Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Co., 205- N. C. 292, 171 S. E. 100
(1933).
'Hall v. Southern Ry., 149 N. C. 108, 65 S. E. 899 (1908) ; Monfils v. Hazle-
wood, 218 N. C. 215, 10 S. E. (2d) 67 (1940) (such holding does not abridge
U. S. CoUst.).
"Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. (2d) 105 (1946).
Id. at 338, 8 S. E. (2d) at 110.
[Vol. 25
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to include actual expenses for nursing and medical service; loss of in-
come;64 suffering, both mental and physical ;55 and any other injury
which naturally and directly are proximate consequences of the wrong-
ful actS6 and which are not elements of damage in the death action.
Punitive damages should not be awarded. 7 If there were an injury to
the property of the injured person as a result of the wrongful act, such
property damages must be recovered in the same action with the per-
sonal injury damages." It would seem that such elements of damage
as permanency of injuries and loss of earning capacity would not be
included since these elements are a part of the elements of damage
resulting from the death.0 It is clear that neither interest 6° nor attorney
fees"' are recoverable as damages.
Only those questions which it is felt the court will of necessity be
called upon to answer in the near future have been brought within the
scope 'of this note. Since the principal case clarifies the existence of a
cause of action which prior to 1915 did not exist and since 1915 evi-
dently was not understood by the bar to exist, it is certain that many
other questions will be presented for determination.
Louis J. PoissoN, JR.
Gifts of Corporate Stock-Transfer on Corporation Books
to Donor and Donee Jointly
In Buffaloe v. Barnes' a purchaser of 70 shares of corporate stock
directed that the certificate be issued in the names of himself and his
niece "as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in
common." He told the broker handling the transaction that he wanted
it that way so that if he pre-deceased her it would belong outright to
her, and if she pre-deceased him it would belong outright to him. The
certificate was delivered to him and was found at his death in his safety
deposit box. A dividend check payable to both had been indorsed by
her and delivered to him. Alleging a gift inter vivos, she -claimed the
shares as survivor in the joint tenancy. In an action by the executor
"Ledford v. Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. E. 421 (1922);
Rushing v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 149 N. C. 158, 62 S. E. 890 (1908).
r' Britt v. Carolina Northern R. R., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S. E. 601 (1908), rehear-
ing denied, 149 N. C. 581, 64 S. E. 1135 (1908) (physical injury must accompany
mental suffering).
"Lane v. Southern Ry., 192 N. C. 287, 134 S. E. 855, 51 A. L. R. 1114 (1926).
17 Rippey v. Miller, 33 N. C. 247 (1850).
5 See note 15 supra.
Poe v. Raleigh & A. A. L. R. R., 141 N. C. 525, 54 S. E. 406 (1906) ; Burton
v. Wilmington R. R., 82 N. C. 505 (1880).
" Penny v. A. C. L. R. R., 161 N. C. 523, 77 S. E. 774, Ann. Cas. 1914D 992(1913).
81 Crutchfield v. Foster, 214 N. C. 551, 200 S. E. 395 (1938).
1226 N. C. 313, 38 S. E. (2d) 222 (1946), petition to rehear denied, 226 N. C.
app. (Oct. 9, 1946).
